cs.CR · 2026-07-30 · No. 69

Cryptography and Security, 2026-07-30.

11 new papers in cs.CR. Titles, authors, abstracts. Links to arXiv. Want this in your inbox every morning? Subscribe →

01 — The papers

11 entries
  1. 01

    MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair

    Xuanze Chen, Xukang Xie, Wentao Fu, Jiajun Zhou, Shanqing Yu, Qi Xuan

    cs.CR · cs.AI

    Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist. A malicious instruction crafted by an attacker may be stored in long-term memory, recalled much later, and quietly shape a real action. Recent benchmarks increasingly examine agent memory security, yet few trace the same malicious semantics across persistence, downstream consequences, and selective repair under...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.27080 · PDF

  2. 02

    HoF-Bench: Rediscovering Real AI-Discovered CVEs Without Frontier Models

    Petr Simecek, Elnaz Babayeva, Jiri Balhar, Michal Bida, Michal Buran, Vaclav Cadek, Luigino Camastra, Tomas Dulka,...

    cs.CR · cs.LG

    LLM-based analyzers have begun finding real vulnerabilities in mature open-source projects: AISLE's analyzer is credited with more than 280 CVEs across 78 projects, including OpenSSL, curl, and GnuTLS. We introduce HoF-Bench (named after AISLE's public Hall of Fame), a benchmark built from 95 of these public AI-discovered CVEs across eight repositories pinned at vulnerable commits. Analyzers receive source and target-file scope but not CVE...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.27030 · PDF

  3. 03

    AgentSnare: Learning to Delay, Divert, and Defuse Autonomous Penetration Agents

    Ruoyu Wang, Heng Zhao, Renjie Wu, Mengnan Zhao, Zhixuan Chu, Wanyu Lin, Tianhang Zheng

    cs.CR · cs.CL · cs.LG

    Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools. This dependence allows defenders to inject deceptive observations that can mislead the agent's decision-making process. However, existing defenses rely heavily on static, isolated artifacts planted in the environment prior to an attack. Advanced agents can progressively recognize and...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26998 · PDF

  4. 04

    Defending Against Backdoor Attacks via Alignment Checking in Model-Contrastive Federated Learning

    Hongliang Zhang, Zhongyuan Yu, Guijuan Wang, Tianqing He, Wenshuo Ma, Xiaosong Zhang, Jiguo Yu

    cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.LG

    Federated Learning (FL) is vulnerable to backdoor attacks because of its distributed nature in edge computing scenarios. Existing defense methods show limited efficacy as they overlook the deviations among benign local updates caused by statistical heterogeneity and the stealthiness of backdoor attacks. To tackle these issues, we propose FedDAB, a two-phase method that combines local contrastive regularization with alignment checking, to...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26933 · PDF

  5. 05

    ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned

    Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov

    cs.CR · cs.LG

    As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger,...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26849 · PDF

  6. 06

    SecRespond: Benchmarking AI Agents for Real-World Post-Compromise Incident Response

    Lehan Wang, Boli Chen, Ruixue Ding, Pengjun Xie, Jinwei Huang, Zhendong Liu, Shuo Wang, Tao Lei, Xin Ouyang, Xiaomeng Li

    cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.CL

    Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities. However, existing cybersecurity benchmarks focus on pre-compromise settings where agents are placed in a clean and idealized environment before an attack occurs. This leaves the post-compromise setting underexplored....

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26791 · PDF

  7. 07

    FARI: Robust One-Step Inversion for Watermarking in Diffusion Models

    Jindong Yang, Han Fang, Weiming Zhang, Nenghai Yu, Kejiang Chen

    cs.CR · cs.AI

    Inversion-based watermarking is a promising approach to authenticate diffusion-generated images, yet practical use is bottlenecked by inversion that is both slow and error-prone. While the primary challenge in the watermarking setting is robustness against external distortions, existing approaches over-optimize internal truncation error, and because that error scales with the sampler step size, they are inherently confined to high-NFE (number...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26723 · PDF

  8. 08

    Graph Is the Verifier: Agentic Reinforcement Learning for Interprocedural Vulnerability Detection

    Yikun Li, Ting Zhang, Jiakun Liu, Jinfeng Jiang, Yuheng Yieh, Yixin Yang, Wen Bin Leow, Yide Yin, Yintong Huo, Eng...

    cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.SE

    Real-world vulnerabilities often span multiple functions, yet most learning-based detectors classify each function in isolation: on a sample of real CVEs, we find that 71.7% of vulnerable functions require evidence from outside the function to be classified correctly. Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) could close this gap by enabling a model to gather that evidence itself, but it lacks a reliable reward, since a reward defined on the final...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26656 · PDF

  9. 09

    Borrowed Strength: Best-of-N Search over a Code EncodingBreaks Self-Check Jailbreak Defenses

    Haoyu Zhang, Shibo Zheng, Xiangchen Guan, Zhuoxi Wang, Zijian Xiao, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita

    cs.CR · cs.AI

    A self-check defense asks the target model to assess a request before answering it; SAGE, the strongest published instance, reports an average 99% defense success rate. We show it can be breached by composing two attacks that are individually harmless against it: an established code-completion encoding and an established best-of-N search, neither of which exceeds 4.7% of behaviors alone. Composed, with the search budget spent on the encoding,...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26639 · PDF

  10. 10

    Guarding Organizations Against Malware Risk: A Novel Graph-Based Malware Detection Method

    Yinan Gao, Jiarong Xu, Xiaohang Zhao, Xiao Fang

    cs.CR · cs.AI

    Organizational digitalization expands cybersecurity risks, making cybersecurity an increasingly important research area in Information Systems (IS). Among these risks, malware has become a pervasive and destructive threat. Byte-based machine learning (ML) methods are widely used for malware detection but remain vulnerable to evasive behaviors that manipulate raw bytes to evade detection. Graph-based methods are less affected by such...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26634 · PDF

  11. 11

    Recover, Decode, Reguard: Guard-Agnostic Defense Amplification againstEncoded VLM Jailbreaks

    Haoyu Zhang, Zhuoxi Wang, Shibo Zheng, Zijian Xiao, Xiangchen Guan, Mohammad Zandsalimy, Shanu Sushmita

    cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.LG

    Safety classifiers ("guards") are the dominant black-box defense for vision-language models, yet they judge an input's surface form, not its meaning: a harmful request re-encoded as set theory, formal logic, a rare language, code, or an image of text slips past a guard that would block it in plain language -- the decode gap. The natural fix is a guard-agnostic recover-and-decode amplifier that transcribes image content and restates encoded...

    arxiv.org/abs/2607.26574 · PDF

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