cs.CR · 2026-09-15 · No. 114
Cryptography and Security, 2026-09-15.
4 new papers in cs.CR. Titles, authors,
abstracts. Links to arXiv. Want this in your inbox every morning? Subscribe →
01 — The papers
4 entries-
01
Vulnerability Localization Benchmark: Measuring Agentic Security Analysis at Repository Scale
Aman Priyanshu, Supriti Vijay, Kimia Majd, Xuhong He, Fraser Burch, Takahiro Matsumoto, Jianliang He, Baturay...
cs.CR · cs.AI
Language-model agents increasingly operate over complete software repositories, yet cybersecurity evaluations primarily measure whether they can detect, reproduce, or repair vulnerabilities rather than whether they can locate the relevant code. We study vulnerability localization: given a weakness class and an unfamiliar repository, identify the implementation files associated with that weakness. We introduce the Vulnerability Localization...
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02
When the World Lies: Backdoor Attacks on Latent World Models for Downstream Control
Roberto Riaño, Gorka Abad, Stjepan Picek, Aitor Urbieta
cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.LG
Pretrained world models, learned simulators that encode an observation into a latent state and predict how it evolves under actions, are beginning to be reused as off-the-shelf dynamics backbones for control, like pretrained encoders and language models are reused today. We show that this reuse opens a supply-chain backdoor: an adversary who controls only a released checkpoint can hijack the downstream controller, even though the victim...
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03
Automating Attack Graph Construction for Agentic Pentesting. Towards Neuro-Symbolic Vulnerability Hunting
Oliver Stevanovic, Jasmin Wachter
cs.CR · cs.AI
Logic attack graphs grounded in scanner output provide explicit and auditable attack path reasoning LLM-based agents lack. Integrating symbolic frameworks such as MulVAL to contemporary security workflows or agentic pipelines, however, requires translating scanner evidence to initial facts, and creating domain-specific rules. We present a semi-automated pipeline that addresses this interoperability problem and depict its feasibility in a...
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04
Divide, Consult, Conquer: Capability Laundering Through Aligned LLMs
Mark Russinovich, Blake Bullwinkel, Giorgio Severi, Cristian Ovadiuc, Ahmed Salem
cs.CR · cs.AI
Language model safety is typically evaluated one interaction at a time. We show that a weaker, unaligned model can split a harmful task into benign-looking subproblems, consult a stronger aligned model independently on each, and combine the answers locally. We call this attack capability laundering. Unlike a jailbreak, no single response is a harmful task. We measure consultation-aided uplift using tasks that a raw frontier model solves, the...
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